THE ALIEN CONTRACT LABOR LAW.
T HE effort to control by national legislation the vast and increasing stream of immigration into this country has assumed two forms. On the one hand there has been restrictive or selective legislation, intended to sift out from the mass of immigrants the more undesirable individuals and to return them to their native lands. Considerable progress has been made in the elaboration and in the enforcement of such legislation. On the other hand there has been prohibitive legislation, the object of which is to exclude certain foreigners who come to our shores under contract to work here. Perhaps this is not strictly immigration legislation; yet the debates in Congress and the public agitation that preceded the enactment of these laws clearly show that they were regarded as measures restricting immigration, and in their latest form they are part and parcel of our immigration statutes.
The development of this second body of laws and the construction placed upon them by the courts show how strongly rooted is the American spirit of liberality toward the immigrant.
The first Alien Contract Labor Law was passed February 26, i885.1 Of the economic and political causes that led to the enactment of this statute the courts have taken cognizance. In the first case decided under the act the court said:
The motives and the history of the act are matters of common knowledge. It had become the practice for large capitalists in this country to contract with their agents abroad for the shipments of great numbers of an ignorant and servile class of foreign laborers, under contract by which the employer agreed, on the one hand, to prepay their passage, while, upon the other hand, the laborers agreed to work after their arrival at a certain rate of wages. The effect of this was to break down the labor market and to reduce the laborers engaged in like occupations to the level of the assisted immigrant. The evil finally became so flagrant that an appeal was made to Congress for relief by I U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. 23, p. 332. 49 This content downloaded from 162. In subsequent decisions 2 these facts have been restated; and in one instance the court touched upon the potent force that pushed the law through Congress:
The labor organizations of the country appealed to the political parties and to legislatures and to Congress for help by way of correction of the evils. They furnished proof, if proof were needed, that when a strike in this country occurred or one was threatened or impending, or when labor was in great demand, the large concerns with much capital behind them sent agents to Europe, and sometimes to Asia, for laborers to take the place of workmen. They were brought over under contract.
Many of them lived when here but little, if any, better than animals.
. . .They lived together in large numbers, in small rooms. Many lived together regardless of sex, and often regardless of the marriage relations. They lived on nearly nothing, and that nearly nothing was often food of the most disgusting kind; and so living they only asked, and only received, wages on which an American could not live. They gave their children no education. They never intended to make this country their home, and yet tens of thousands of them went through the forms of naturalization. They debased and prostituted the rights of suffrage.'
These graphic descriptions by the judges clearly explain the feelings that gave rise to these laws. visions with great strictness. It was early held that " the statute is highly penal, and must be so construed as to bring within its condemnation only those who are shown by direct and positive averments to be embraced within the terms of the law." I Therefore, although the suit is of a civil nature, it yet has some of the characteristics of criminal procedure, and the pleadings are to be scrutinized closely and construed strictly. The courts accordingly compel the complainant to set forth fully, in hiis declaration, the terms of the contract, the character of the labor which was to be performed, and the facts that the alien actually came to the United States in pursuance of the contract and actually did the work contracted for. The complaint must also state definitely all the acts done by the defendant to assist in the immigration." 2 All the circumstances must be stated which are requisite to support the action. Nothing is to be left to inference or conjecture."3 Even when the declarations were in the language of the statute, alleging that the defendant "sassisted, encouraged and solicited" an alien to immigrate, it was held insufficient, because the definite acts must be set forth.4
While the courts have refused to include cases which were not within the letter of the law, they have excluded cases which, although within its letter, were not within its spirit. exceptions of the act of I885. The supreme court promptly reversed this decision; and in an elaborate and comprehensive opinion Justice Brewer defined the policy which should control the interpretation of the law. He said that the letter of the law was in conflict wvith its spirit, and that the spirit should prevail. He discovered the spirit of the law in the intent of the legislature, in the title of the act and in "1 the evils which it is designed to remedy; and for this the court properly looks at contemporary events, the situation as it existed and as it was forced upon the attention of the legislative body." These evils resulted from the wholesale importation of cheap laborers "I who would have never seen our shores but for the inducements and allurements of men whose only object it is to obtain labor at the lowest possible rate, regardless of the social and material wellbeing of our own citizens, and regardless of the evil consequences which result to Amierican laborers from such immi-
The purpose of the act being the protection of American labor, the courts have construed it to be indicative of a desire to maintain the American standard of living among the unskilled workers of our land.
III
The law seeks to protect skilled labor also against undesirable competition. It allows the importation of skilled labor only in case an industry new to the United States is to be established and such labor cannot be found in the United States. The law also makes exception in favor of professional people. It has been necessary to interpret these provisions, and in their interpretation the courts have again been guided by the spirit of the law.
In the first case which involved the construction of these provisions the court held that a milliner imported under contract was not a professional artist within the statute,' nor was a woman thus engaged performing labor upon a new industry.
In the next case it appeared that the defendants had made a contract with a Frenchman to come to the United States and have disclosed the fact that they must resort to foreign workmen, " and that such reasonable effort would have enabled them to discover or to train workmen competent to do the desired work."' This decision accordingly goes to the length of requiring the employer to train his own workmen for a new industry, and seems thereby virtually to annul the statute itself. It has not been followed in the later decisions.
In the next case to come up for adjudication, an American firm had imported a " window-dresser " from England. While the declaration was held defective, the court nevertheless proceeded to discuss the distinction between "sskilled labor" and unskilled labor.
The habit of working with the hands is not by any means the criterion.
All men work with their hands. But in some occupations, like that of working with a spade or shovel and wheelbarrow, or as a common hand in a saw-mill or in the lumber woods with a peavy or cross-cut saw, the value of the labor consists principally in the physical result accomplished. The surgeon also works with his hands, but the beneficial It was after this decision that the amendments of I89I were added to the law.
In the next case in which this question was considered, the court declared obiter that a ladies' kid-glove cutter was a skilled workman, and that the industry was a new one under the meaning of the act. These questions, it was held, were questions of fact for the jury.2
After the amendnment of I89I a chemist was admitted because he belonged to a " recognized profession." " Chemistry,"
the court said, " is a science, the knowledge of which is acquired only after patient study and application, and one who has mastered it must certainly be regarded as one engaged in the practice of a profession which is generally recognized in this country."
The courts, then, insist upon interpreting the exclusion to operate without exception only upon unskilled, cheap, manual labor. It applies to skilled labor only when the same can be secured in the United States, and it does not apply at all to professional or technical labor. A contract will not be inferred simply because the circumstances indicate an understanding between the parties. For example: an alien, in England, wrote to a person in the United
States, saying that he had heard that the addressee was in want of smelters, and that, if passes were sent him, he and a fellow-workman would come over as soon as possible, adding, " we have both worked in the spelter works for many years." This letter was handed to a third party in America, and he replied: " I have this day bought two tickets for you . . . and all you have to do is to take this letter to the railroad company and get your tickets.
. . . We can give you steady work and have places for about six or eight more smelters if they want to come. . . Tickets will not be good after July i8." These letters were all the evidence of the agreement. The court held that there was no contract. The statutes must be held to mean a complete contract: that is to say, an agreement entered into for a sufficient consideration to perform some kind of labor or services, to the terms of which the parties have mutually assented. If an implied contract is counted upon, a state of facts must be alleged from which a court or jury might lawfully draw the inference, as a matter of fact, that the alien had agreed to perform labor or service of some kind, and that some other person had agreed to accept such services.
Mere prepayment of transportation would not constitute a contract., The circuit court of appeals sustained the lower court in this decision.2
In another case it was held that neither the prepayment of transportation, nor other assistance or encouragement given to the importation of aliens, is a violation of the law, without a 
